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Suppose each of n men and n women is located at a point in a metric space. A woman ranks the men in order
of their distance to her from closest to farthest, breaking ties at random. e men rank the women similarly. An
interesting problem is to use these ranking lists and nd a stable matching in the sense of Gale and Shapley. is
problem formulation naturally models preferences in several real world applications; for example, dating sites, room
renting/leing, ride hailing and labor markets. Two key questions that arise in this seing are: (a) When is the stable
matching unique without resorting to tie breaks? (b) If X is the distance between a randomly chosen stable pair, what
is the distribution of X and what is E(X )? ese questions address conditions under which it is possible to nd a
unique (stable) partner, and the quality of the stable matching in terms of the rank or the proximity of the partner.
We study dating sites and ride hailing as prototypical examples of stable matchings in discrete and continuous
metric spaces, respectively. In the dating site model, each man/woman is assigned to a point on the k-dimensional
hypercube based on their answers to a set of k questions with binary answers (e.g. , like/dislike). We consider two
dierent metrics on the hypercube: Hamming and Weighted Hamming (in which the answers to some questions
carry more weight). Under both metrics, there are exponentially many stable matchings when k = blognc. ere is a
unique stable matching, with high probability, under the Hamming distance when k = Ω(n6), and under the Weighted
Hamming distance when k > (2 + ϵ) logn for some ϵ > 0. Furthermore, under the Weighted Hamming distance,
we show that log(X )/log(n) → −1, as n → ∞, when k > (1 + ϵ) logn for some ϵ > 0. In the ride hailing model,
passengers and cabs are modeled as points on the line and matched based on Euclidean distance (a proxy for pickup
time). Assuming the locations of the passengers and cabs are independent Poisson processes of dierent intensities,
we derive bounds on the distribution of X in terms of busy periods at a last-come-rst-served preemptive-resume
(LCFS-PR) queue. We also get bounds on E(X ) using combinatorial arguments.
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21 INTRODUCTION
e stable marriage problem was rst introduced by Gale and Shapley [1962] as a way of modeling the
college admissions process, in which students are matched with colleges, and the process of courtship
leading to marriage, in which women and men are matched. ey introduced two key properties of
matchings: stability and optimality. ese properties are quite well-known and we will recall them formally
later; for now, we proceed informally. Stability captures the requirement that a matching should not pair a
man M and a woman W with partners whom they both prefer less than each other. Should this happen, M
and W are both incentivized to break up with their assigned partners and match with each other. Gale and
Shapley [1962] show that there is always at least one stable matching and present the deferred-acceptance
algorithm for nding it. Optimality refers to the quality of a matching in terms of the rank of men in their
partners’ preference lists, and vice versa. e stable marriage problem has also been studied in several
other real world seings. One famous example is the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP) [Roth,
1984, 1996] where medical school students are matched to residency programs through a centralized stable
matching mechanism. Other examples include online dating [Hitsch et al., 2010], sorority rush [Mongell
and Roth, 1991], and school choice [Abdulkadiroglu and So¨nmez, 2003].
Knuth [1976] initiated the theoretical analysis of large-scale instances of the stable marriage problem
under the “random preference list” assumption, where the preference lists of each man and woman are
drawn independently and uniformly from the set of all permutations. Knuth poses the question of estimating
the average number of stable matchings when n, the number of men (equal to the number of women) grows
large, and provides an integral formula for the probability that a given matching is stable. Piel [1989, 1992]
evaluated this integral and showed that the average number of stable matchings is asymptotic to e−1n lnn
as n →∞, and that any given woman (or man) has Θ(logn) stable partners, on average. We mention a few
other results under the random preference list assumption relevant to our work: Immorlica and Mahdian
[2005] proved that if the preference list of each woman has only a constant number of entries, then the
number of people with multiple stable partners is vanishingly small.1 Ashlagi et al. [2015] studied the
“unbalanced” case when there are n men and n+k women, for k ≥ 1. ey show that, with high probability,2
the fraction of men and women with multiple stable partners tends to zero as n → ∞. is line of work
is theoretically very interesting, but preference lists in the real world are rarely drawn at random—there
can exist a signicant correlation in the choices people and organizations make. For example, Roth and
Peranson [1999] empirically observed correlations in the NRMP preference lists; the applicants largely
prefer the same programs and the programs tend to rank the applicants similarly (i.e., a top applicant in one
program was also top-ranked in other programs). ey note that these correlations can result in a small set
of stable matchings. Holzman and Samet [2014] make the previous observation mathematically precise by
assuming each participant picks their preference list from a small set of permutations.
While the above correlations capture a “sameness” in the preferences of people and organizations, in
this paper we consider correlations due to “proximity”. Proximity can arise from a coincidence of likes
and interests between members of the two sides of a matching market. For example, each member of a
matching market answers a questionnaire describing their likes, dislikes, interests or requirements. e
questionnaire can either be the same for both sides of the matching market (e.g., online dating) or dierent
(e.g., renters answer questions describing their preferred properties while lessors describe aributes of their
preferred renters). e vector of answers can be viewed as points in a metric space and proximity is equated
with distance in the metric space. Each participant in the market ranks members of the other side based on
their proximity to the participant, from closest to farthest. Distance also arises naturally in the case of ride
1Roth and Peranson [1999] also empirically observe this phenomenon in the context of candidates interviewing for jobs.
2We say a sequence of events En occur with high probability if limn→∞ P(En ) = 1.
3hailing, where it is desirable to match a hailer with the closest available car. us, a wide variety of real
world applications can be modeled in this framework; for example, dating sites,3 renting/leing,4 labor
markets,5 and ride hailing.6
Our results. We analyze stable matchings in discrete and continuous metric spaces as the number of
participants grows large. We make distributional assumptions on the distances between the participants
(hence on the preference lists) and analyze the number and quality of stable matchings. e quality of a
stable matching is captured by how small the distances are between stable partners in the matching. When
the metric space is continuous, the stable matching is almost surely unique under very mild and natural
distributional assumptions. However, this is not necessarily true in discrete metric spaces. An interesting
nding of our work is that a participant (on either side of the market) is at the same distance from their
partner in all stable matchings. us, it makes sense to consider X , the distance between a randomly chosen
stable pair (regardless of which stable matching they’re picked from, should there be more than one stable
matching). We are interested in the distribution of X and E(X ) as the number of participants grows large.
We explore these quantities in the dating sites and ride hailing seings.
Dating sites. Suppose the men and women of a community are seeking to get matched to a partner in
a dating site. At the time of signing up, participants are usually asked to answer a xed set of k yes/no
questions about their preferences, (e.g., “Do you like pets?”, “Are you a morning person?”). We call the
k-bit vector representing a participant’s answers to these questions the participant’s prole. Each prole
can be modeled as a point on the k-dimensional hypercube, Qk . e aim is to match a woman to a man
whose prole is closest or most similar to hers. We consider two dierent metrics on Qk for measuring this
similarity: the Hamming distance and the Weighted Hamming distance. e Hamming distance between two
proles is equal to the number of entries at which they disagree. e Weighted Hamming distance weighs
some disagreements more; the details are in Section 3. Since the distances are not necessarily distinct, we
also assume that each person has a “tie-breaking preference list” for ranking members of the other side and
uses this to break ties. One way to think of the actual preference list of a woman is that it ranks the men by
distance, closest rst. Men at the same distance are ranked according to her tie-breaking preference list.
e men form their preference lists similarly.7
We consider the seing in which proles are picked independently and uniformly at random fromQk , and
the tie-breaking preference lists are chosen independently and uniformly from the set of all permutations.
Let ϵ > 0 be an arbitrary positive number. We shall prove that under both the Hamming and the Weighted
Hamming distances, for k < (1 − ϵ) logn, the fraction of people with multiple stable partners tends to
zero, with high probability, as n → ∞. However, if k = blognc, there are exponentially many stable
matchings. We show that, with high probability, the stable matching is unique under the Hamming distance
for k = Ω(n6), and it is unique under the Weighted Hamming distance for k > (2+ϵ) logn, without resorting
to tie breaks.8 We derive a lower bound on X under the Hamming distance. Under the Weighted Hamming
distance, we prove that if k > (1 + ϵ) logn, then logX/logn → −1 in probability.
3Tinder (hps://www.gotinder.com), Zoosk (hps://www.zoosk.com)
4Airbnb (hps://www.airbnb.com), Zillow (hp://www.zillow.com)
5LinkedIn (hps://www.linkedin.com)
6Uber (hps://www.uber.com), Ly (hps://www.ly.com)
7One way to generalize this model to matching markets with two dierent questionnaires (one for each side of the market) is to
ask each participant to answer their questionnaire and also to indicate their best answers from participants on the other side of the
market (e.g., renters and lessors answer their questions and that of an ideal response from the other side). e overall prole is
then formed by concatenating the answers to both questionnaires.
8Tie-breaking represents chance, which, in the context of dating, could reasonably be thought of as being less preferable to choice.
In other words, a participant would prefer to nd his/her partner from their prole rather than through a process involving a coin
ip.
4Ride hailing. Consider the problem of matching passengers and cabs on a street. Let blue and red points
on the real line represent the location of passengers and cabs, respectively. Suppose the blue and red points
occur according to two independent Poisson processes with respective intensities λ and µ. Each point forms
its preference list by ranking points of the other color in an increasing order of their Euclidean distance to
it. Holroyd et al. [2009] studied translation-invariant matchings between the points of two d-dimensional
Poisson processes with the same intensities (λ = µ). ey show the natural algorithm of matching mutually
closest pairs of points iteratively yields an almost surely unique stable matching. ey analyze the tail
behavior of X , the distance between a typical pair of stable partners. In the 1-dimensional case, they derive
power law upper and lower bounds for the tail distribution of X . In this paper, we study the stable matching
problem between two Poisson processes on the real line in the unbalanced case where λ < µ. We derive
bounds on the distribution of X in terms of the busy cycles of a last-come-rst-served preemptive-resume
(LCFS-PR) queue.9 Using combinatorial arguments, we prove that E(X ) ≤ (1 + ln µ+λµ−λ )/(µ − λ).
e rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we dene the stable matching problem, introduce
relevant notation, and state some known results. In Section 3 we describe the stable matching problem on
hypercubes and present our results in this model. In Section 4 we analyze the stable matching problem on
the real line. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 BACKGROUND AND PREVIOUS WORK
A community of n men and n women is represented by setsM andW, respectively. Suppose each person
x in the community has a strict preference list, x , which ranks members of the opposite gender. us,
y1 x y2 means x prefers y1 to y2. A matching µ is a mapping fromM ∪W to itself, such that for each
man m, µ(m) ∈ W ∪ {m}, for each woman w , µ(w) ∈ M ∪ {w}, and for any m,w ∈ M ∪W, µ(m) = w
implies µ(w) =m. A man or woman x is unmatched under µ if µ(x) = x . A pair (m,w) ∈ M ×W is called
a blocking pair for a matching µ if w m µ(m) and m w µ(w). A matching is called stable if it does not
have any blocking pairs. If a manm and a woman w are matched to each other in a stable matching, we say
w andm are a stable partner of each other.
e problem of stable matching was rst introduced by Gale and Shapley [1962]. ey proved that
there always exists a stable matching, which can be found using an iterative algorithm called the deferred-
acceptance algorithm. is algorithm proceeds in a series of proposals and tentative approvals until there is
a one-to-one matching between the men and women. When the women propose, they each end up with
the best stable partner they can have in any stable matching. is matching, oen called woman-optimal,
also pairs each man with his lowest-ranked stable partner. e man-optimal stable matching, which results
when the men do the proposing, may be distinct from the woman-optimal stable matching; thus, there may
be many stable matchings. Under the random preference list assumption, Piel [1989, 1992] proved that
the average number of stable matchings is asymptotic to e−1n lnn as n →∞, and each person has Θ(logn)
stable partners, on average. e stable marriage problem can be extended to the unbalanced case where the
number of men and women is not equal. It is clear that for any stable matching in the unbalanced case,
there are some people who remain unmatched. is may also happen in the balanced case if the preference
lists of some men or women are not complete. We state the following theorems for ready reference.
Theorem 2.1 (Rural Hospital). [McVitie and Wilson, 1970, Roth, 1986] e set of men and women who
are not matched is the same for all stable matchings.
Theorem 2.2. [Immorlica and Mahdian, 2005] Consider the stable marriage problem with n men and n
women. Suppose the preference lists of the women are drawn independently and uniformly at random from the
9Such a queue is also called a stack [Kelly and Yudovina, 2014].
5set of all orderings of men. For a xed k ≥ 1, let the preference lists of the men be drawn independently and
uniformly at random from the set of all ordered lists of any k women. (e k women on two dierent men’s
preference lists may be dierent.) In this seing, the expected number of women who have multiple stable
partners is o(n).
Theorem 2.3. [Ashlagi et al., 2015] Consider a stable marriage problem with n men and n + k women,
for arbitrary k = k(n) ≥ 1. Suppose the preference lists of women are drawn independently and uniformly
at random from the set of all orderings of men, and the preference lists of men are drawn independently and
uniformly at random from the set of all orderings of women. e fractions of men and women who have
multiple stable partners tends to zero, with high probability, as n →∞.
e independence of the randomly drawn preference lists is the key assumption in the analysis of both
eorem 2.2 and eorem 2.3. Under this assumption, eorem 2.2 shows that if the preference lists of one
side of the market is limited to a xed k ≥ 1 entries, the fraction of men and women with multiple stable
partners is vanishingly small. eorem 2.3 proves the same result for unbalanced markets where there is a
size k ≥ 1 discrepancy between the number of men and women. In the following section, we derive similar
results for the matching markets with correlated preference lists where each person reveals k ≥ 1 bits of
information about their preference by answering k yes/no questions.
3 STABLE MATCHING ON HYPERCUBES
Consider a dating site with n men and n women, represented by setsM andW. Let S =M ∪W and
let k be a positive integer. For each x ∈ S, let the k-bit vector representing their prole be denoted by
ak (x) =
(
a1(x), . . . ,ak (x)
) ∈ {0, 1}k , where ai (x) = 0 if x ’s answer to the ith question is “no”, and ai (x) = 1
otherwise. us, each prole is a point on the k-dimensional hypercube, Qk = {0, 1}k . For simplicity, we
shall suppress the subscript k from ak whenever it can be inferred.
In this seing, participants prefer to be matched to someone with a similar prole. Similarity is measured
using two metrics on Qk : e Hamming distance and the Weighted Hamming distance. e Hamming
distance dh(a, a′) between a and a′ equals
dh(a, a′) ,
k∑
i=1
1(ai , a′i ).
e Hamming distance assumes that all questions have the same weight. However, some questions may
have higher importance than others. For example, ”Are you allergic to cats?” will likely outweigh ”Do you
like caramel?”. e Weighted Hamming distance,
dw (a, a′) ,
k∑
i=1
2−i1(ai , a′i ),
addresses this by assigning dierent weights to dierent questions.
Remark. Our results for the Weighted Hamming distance (eorem 3.4) can be extended to any exponen-
tially decaying weights.
Remark. When making statements which apply to both metrics we shall use the notation d(., .). We shall
use d(x ,y) to denote the distance between the proles of participants x and y.
e preference list of x is arranged according to distance, as follows: for x ,y,y ′ ∈ S,
y x y ′ ⇐⇒ d(x ,y) ≤ d(x ,y ′).
6Since distances are not necessarily distinct, a tie-breaking rule is needed to strictly order preference lists.
As mentioned in the Introduction, participant x uses their “tie-breaking list”, Tx , to break ties. us, each
woman w , ranks men in increasing order of their distance to her and arranges men at the same distance
according to their order in her tie-breaking list, Tw .10 For any x and y in S, Tx is not necessarily equal to
Ty . Let the nal strict preference list of user x be denoted by Px . We shall use x to indicate ordering in
this list. We are now ready to state
e Prole Matching Problem (PMP). Given n men and n women and their strict preference lists, the
prole matching problem seeks to nd a stable matching between the men and the women.
A priori, it seems there may be many stable matchings and multiple stable partners for some women
and men. However, we shall see in Lemma 3.1 that the multiple stable matchings, should they exist, are all
essentially equal in quality. Suppose µ is a stable matching for the PMP. Let dµ (x) be the distance between
x and µ(x),
dµ (x) , d
(
x , µ(x)) .
Lemma 3.1. Let µ1 and µ2 be two stable matchings for the Prole Matching Problem. en dµ1(x) = dµ2(x)
for every x ∈ S.
Proof. See appendix A.1. 
According to Lemma 3.1, dµ (x) does not depend on µ. Hence, we shall simply denote dµ (x) by d(x) and call
d(x) the matching distance of x . Let the random variable X denote the matching distance of a randomly
chosen participant x . We analyze X in the following section.
3.1 The Random Profile Matching Problem (RPMP)
We now analyze the PMP under certain distributional assumptions of preference lists and proles when
the number of participants grows large. Our main goals are to understand the following questions: How
many questions are needed to nd a unique partner for each participant without resorting to tie-breaking?
What is the matching distance, X? ese questions will be answered under the Hamming and the Weighted
Hamming metrics.
Probabilistic assumptions. We assume each participant answers each of the k questions equally likely
with a “yes” or a “no”. Further, the answers to all questions by all the participants are independent.
Geometrically, this assumption places the k-bit prole vector of each participant (or, equivalently, the
participant) at one of the 2k vertices ofQk , independently and uniformly at random. e preference lists are
then generated based on the distances induced by the above placement and the tie-breaking lists Tx ,x ∈ S.
We assume each Tx is generated independently and uniformly at random from the set of all orderings of
men (or women, depending on x ).
e RPMP-k . Given n men and n women, each of whose preference lists are generated according to the
above probabilistic assumptions, the RPMP-k aims to nd a stable matching between the men and the
women.
Remark. Note that RPMP-0 is equivalent to the standard stable matching problem with randomly generated
preference lists.
10If w breaks ties at random, then Tw is a random ordering of all the men.
73.2 Our results
In this section we present our main results for the RPMP-k . eorem 3.2 considers the case wherek ≤ blognc
and eorem 3.3 and eorem 3.4 study larger values of k . Due to page limitation we moved all the proofs
to appendix.
Theorem 3.2. Consider the RPMP-k for k ≥ 1. Fix ϵ > 0. Under any metric onQk , the following statements
hold with high probability:
(i) if k < (1 − ϵ) logn, the fraction of users with multiple stable partners tends to zero as n →∞, so long
as tie-breaking is used; and
(ii) if k = blognc, there are O(n) users with multiple stable partners and there are exponentially many
stable matchings.
Theorem 3.3. Under the Hamming distance, with high probability, we have the following:
(i) if k(n) = Ω(n3), the fraction of users with multiple stable partners tends to zero as n →∞;
(ii) if k(n) = Ω(n6), the stable matching is unique without resorting to tie-breaking; and
(iii) for any β > 1,
P
(
X <
k
2 −
√
βk logn
)
≤ n1−β .
Theorem 3.4. Fix ϵ > 0. Under the Weighted Hamming distance, with high probability, we have the
following:
(i) if k(n) > (1 + ϵ) logn, the fraction of users with multiple stable partners tends to zero as n → ∞.
Moreover,
logX
logn
p−−→ −1,
where
p−−→ represents convergence in probability; and
(ii) if k(n) > (2 + ϵ) logn, the stable matching is unique, without resorting to tie-breaking.
According to eorem 3.2, in large instances of the RPMP-k , if users answer even one question (k = 1),
the preference lists become skewed so that, with high probability, any given participant has a unique stable
partner. is contrasts starkly with the case k = 0, where Piel [1992] showed that each participant has, on
average, Θ(logn) stable partners. In eorem 3.3 and 3.4 we distinguish the statements “the fraction of
participants with a unique stable partner goes to 1 with high probability” from the statement “there is a
unique stable matching”, since the former does not imply the laer. Moreover, our method of proving the
laer consists of proving the following two steps: (i) if the distances of each man from a given woman are
distinct, then she will have a unique stable partner (see Lemma A.4); and (ii) if this holds for all the women
(or all the men), then the stable matching is unique. From a market design perspective the uniqueness
of the stable matching is important to achieve a shape prediction of the market. eorem 3.3 shows that
under the Hamming distance, if k(n) = Ω(n6), with high probability, there exists a unique stable matching
without resorting to tie-breaking. However, asking that many questions from users is not feasible. On the
bright side, eorem 3.4 shows that if the answers to questions carry dierent weights, we can achieve a
unique stable matching with k(n) = O(logn) questions.
ese theorems also study the matching distance, X . It will be clear from the proof of eorem 3.2 that
X = 0, with high probability, when k < (1 − ϵ) logn. eorem 3.3 establishes an upper bound on the
matching distance X . eorem 3.4 covers the case of the Weighted Hamming metric.
Remark. All above theorems can be extended to unbalanced markets with n men and n + r women.
84 STABLE MATCHING ON THE LINE
Consider the problem of matching passengers and cabs on a street. Suppose the passengers and cabs are
represented as blue and red points, respectively, on R. Let B and R denote the set of blue and red points,
respectively. Let S = B ∪ R. A matching between B and R is a mappingM from S to S ∪ {∞}, such that
for every red point r ,M(r ) ∈ B ∪ {∞}, for every blue point b,M(b) ∈ R ∪ {∞}, and for every b, r ∈ S,
M(r ) = b impliesM(b) = r . A point x ∈ S is unmatched ifM(x) = ∞. e preference list of each point is
based on its Euclidean distance to the points with a dierent color, closest rst. A matchingM is stable if
there is no pair (b, r ) ∈ B × R such that
b ,M(r ) and |r − b | < min( |r −M(r )|, |b −M(b)|) .
For any matchingM and any point x ∈ S, let IM(x) ⊂ R denote the open interval which has x andM(x)
at its end-points, and let dM(x) represent the length of IM(x), i.e., dM(x) = |x −M(x)|. We call IM(x) the
matching segment of x , and dM(x) the matching distance of x inM.
With the above denitions, suppose that points in B and R occur according to independent Poisson
processes with rates µ and λ, respectively, where λ ≤ µ. We call the matching problem dened above as
the Poisson Matching problem and denote it by PM(λ, µ). As mentioned in the Introduction, Holroyd et al.
[2009] studied translation-invariant matchings between two d-dimensional Poisson processes with the
same intensities; in particular, they studied stable matchings. ey showed that the following algorithm
nds a unique stable matching: Each blue point simultaneously emits two rays, one in each direction, such
that at any time t , each ray is at distance t from its emier. Once a ray hits an unmatched red point r , the
emier b will be matched to r , and both points leave the system. Denote the unique stable matching byMs
and let x ∈ B be an arbitrary blue point. Dene the random variable X to be x ’s matching distance inMs ,
i.e., X , dMs (x). Holroyd et al. [2009] proved that if µ = λ, E(X 1/2) = ∞.
Theorem 4.1. [Holroyd et al., 2009] Let B and R be independent 1-dimensional Poisson processes of
intensity 1, and let X represent the matching distance of an arbitrary point in the stable matching between B
and R. We have,
E(X 1/2) = ∞ and P(X > r ) ≤ Cr 1/2 ∀r > 0,
for some constant C ∈ (0,∞).
In this section we analyze the 1-dimensional PM(λ, µ) problem for λ < µ. is models the situation in
which there are fewer passengers than cabs and sheds light on the time it would take for a passenger to be
picked up by the nearest cab that is assigned to pick up the passenger.11 us, we shall be interested in the
distribution (eorem 4.5) and the expected value (eorem 4.7) of X . However, in order to get at these
quantities, we need to introduce various ideas such as the relationship among PM(λ, µ), last-come-rst-
served preemptive-resume (LCFS-PR) queue, and nested matchings. We believe these ideas are interesting
in their own right.
4.1 eue Matching
Red partners in a stable matching may be either to the le or to the right of the corresponding blue points.
However, in queue matchings they are either only on the le or only on the right. Consider PM(λ, µ)
with the constraint that each blue point can only be matched to red points that are on its right. In the
passenger-cab scenario, this constraint can be the result of having a one-way street or a road divider, where
each cab can only pick up passengers on its le. In order to nd the stable matching, all the blue points
11Note the nearest cab may not be able to pick up a passenger since it may be assigned to pick up another passenger who is nearer
to the cab than the rst passenger. Hence, stable matchings are quite natural in this seing.
9Fig. 1. Dierent matchings between two point processes. Top: forward queue matchingM+s , Middle: backward
queue matchingM−s , Boom: stable matchingMs .
simultaneously emit a ray to their right at time 0. Once a ray hits an unmatched red point r , the emier b
will be matched to r . It is clear that this algorithm is equivalent to running an LCFS-PR queue where the
time of job arrivals and departures in this queue are represented as blue points and red points, respectively.
e arrival rate is λ and the service rate is µ (the service times are i.i.d. exponentials of rate µ). We call the
resulting stable matching,M+s , the forward queue matching, corresponding to running the queue forward
in time. Similarly, we can dene a backward queue matching,M−q , where each blue point is matched to a
red point on its le, and can be found by running the LCFS-PR queue backward in time. Figure 1 shows
M+s ,M−s , andMs for an instance of the problem. e following are well-known facts about LCFS-PR
queues with rate λ Poisson arrivals and rate µ > λ i.i.d. exponential service times which are independent of
the arrival process. Since λ < µ, the queue is stable and each blue point in B almost surely has a partner
in R. Let x ∈ B be an arbitrary blue point and let X+ be x ’s matching distance inM+s . It is clear that X+
has the same distribution as the busy cycle in the corresponding LCFS-PR queue, where the busy cycle is
the duration of time from the arrival of a job at an empty queue to the time the job leaves the queue. It is
known [Gross and Harris, 1998] that the probability density function of the busy cycle is given by
fλ,µ (t) = 1
t
√
ρ
e(λ+µ)t I1(2t
√
λµ), t > 0,
where ρ = λµ , and I1 is the modied Bessel function of the rst kind. Let B(λ, µ) represent this distribution.
e average busy cycle duration is E(X+) = 1/(µ − λ). In the following section we introduce a class of
matchings which includes both stable and queue matchings.
4.2 Nested Matching
For any interval I ∈ R, represent its closure by I¯ . A matchingM is said to be nested if for any x ,y ∈ S,
x ∈ IM(y) impliesM(x) ∈ IM(y). erefore, in any nested matching if IM(x) ∩ IM(y) , ∅, then one of the
matching segments is nested inside the other one.
Remark. Since the matching segment of an unmatched point x is (x ,∞), there is no matching segment of
a matched point in a nested matching which contains an unmatched point.
From the discussion in the previous section it is easy to see that any queue matching is nested. e following
lemma proves that the stable matchingMs is also nested.
Lemma 4.2. e stable matchingMs is nested.
Proof. See appendix A.2. 
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Let A be the set of all nested matchings between points in B and R. We say a red point r is a potential
match for a blue point b, if there exists a nested matching in which b is matched to r . For any blue point
b ∈ B dene P(b) to be the set of all potential matches of b,
P(b) = {r ∈ R : ∃M ∈ A s.t.M(b) = r }.
e following lemma shows that the set of potential matches of any two blue points are either disjoint or
the same.
Lemma 4.3. For any b1,b2 ∈ B, P(b1) ∩ P(b2) , ∅ implies P(b1) = P(b2).
Proof. See appendix A.2. 
Now dene the relation ∼ on points in B as follow:
b1 ∼ b2 ⇐⇒ P(b1) ∩ P(b2) , ∅.
According to Lemma 4.3, for any b1,b2 ∈ B, if P(b1) and P(b2) are not disjoint, then they are the same.
erefore, ∼ is an equivalence relation on B. For any blue point b ∈ B, dene [b] to be b’s equivalence
class in B, i.e.,
[b] , {b ′ ∈ B : P(b ′) = P(b)}.
Let N (b) represent the size ofb ′s equivalence class, i.e., N (b) = |[b]|. Also dene N +(b) = |{b ′ ∈ [b],b ′ ≥ b}|
and N −(b) = |{b ′ ∈ [b],b ′ ≤ b}|. It is clear that N (b) = N +(b) + N −(b) − 1. In the following lemma we
prove some facts about the structure of the equivalence classes.
Lemma 4.4. Suppose λ < µ and let B and R represent the set of blue and red points in a Poisson matching
problem PM(λ, µ), respectively. For any given blue point b ∈ B we have
(i) there exist r1, r2 ∈ P(b) such that r1 > b and r2 < b, almost surely;
(ii) there exists exactly one potential red point r ∈ P(b) between every two consecutive blue points in [b];
(iii) |P(b)| = N (b) + 1 on {|P(b)| < ∞}; and
(iv) N +(b) and N −(b) are independent geometric random variables with parameter 1 − λ/µ.
Proof. See appendix A.2. 
Let b ∈ B be an arbitrary blue point. Since λ < µ, then almost surely |P(b)| < ∞. From Lemma 4.4, we can
conclude that blue and red points in [b]∪P(b) form a nite sequence {wi }, for −2N −(b)+1 ≤ i ≤ 2N +(b)−1,
where b0 = b, [b] = {wi : i is even}, and P(b) = {wi : i is odd}. In other words, this sequence starts with a
potential red point, alternates between points in [b] and P(b), and ends with another potential red point.
We call the sequence {wi } b’s potential wave and denote it byW(b). Figure 2 shows potential waves of an
instance of PM(λ, µ). 12 A key observation here is that in any nested matching, any blue point in [b] should
be matched to a red point in P(b). erefore, a nested matching rst partitions S into potential waves and
then matches points within each wave, separately. In the following section we present our results on the
analysis of the matching distance X in the stable matchingMs .
12is instance is the same as the instance in Figure 1. As we can see in all the matchings shown in Figure 1, each point is matched
to a point within the same potential wave shown in Figure 2.
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Fig. 2. Dierent potential waves of a sample problem.
4.3 Matching distance, X
e following theorem, proves bounds on the distribution of X , in terms of busy cycles.
Theorem 4.5. Consider an instance of a Poisson matching problem PM(λ, µ), where λ < µ. en we have
min{B1,B′1} < X < max
{2N−1∑
i=1
Bi ,
2N ′−1∑
i=1
B′i
}
where Bi and B′i are i.i.d. random variables with distribution B(λ, µ), and N and N ′ are i.i.d. geometric random
variables with parameter 1 − λ/µ.
Proof. See appendix A.2. 
Using eorem 4.5 we can nd the following upper bound for the expected matching distance E(X ).
Corollary 4.6.
E(X ) ≤
(
1 + µ + λ
µ − λ
)
1
µ − λ .
Proof. See appendix A.2 
Remark. Note that the results of eorem 4.5 and Corollary 4.6 also hold if X is the matching distance in
any nested matching.
In the next theorem we improve the upper bound given in Corollary 4.6 for the expected matching distance
E(X ). e proof of this theorem is extensive and requires some detailed combinatorial arguments. For more
details see appendix A.3.
Theorem 4.7. For the stable matchingMs , we have
E(X ) ≤
(
1 + ln
( µ + λ
µ − λ
) ) 1
µ − λ .
Proof. See appendix A.3. 
In order to evaluate the goodness of the bound in eorem 4.7, note that for large values of µ (µ  λ),
with a high probability, each blue point will be matched to the closest red point to it. erefore, as µ/λ→∞,
X converges to an exponential distribution with rate 2µ (minimum of two i.i.d. exponentials with rate µ)
and E(X ) ∼ 12µ . However, from eorem 4.7, in the limit as µ/λ→∞, E(X ) is upper bounded by 1µ .
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5 CONCLUSION
is paper introduced a model for studying matching markets in which preference lists are drawn according
to distances in appropriate metric spaces, either between the proles of participants or between the
participants themselves. e model naturally captures several aspects of real world matching markets.
Various results regarding the uniqueness and quality of stable matchings were obtained. Specically, for
matchings on the hypercube under the Hamming and Weighted Hamming distances, lower and upper
bounds were obtained on the dimension of the hypercube (equal to the number of questions a participant
in a dating site needs to answer) so as to obtain unique stable partners or stable matchings. Furthermore,
bounds on the distribution and the average value of the matching distance of a typical participant (a measure
of the quality of the stable matching) were obtained for stable matchings on the hypercube and on the real
line.
We view this work as a rst step in studying matching markets in the metric space seing. Several obvious
next steps suggest themselves, notably studying the problem under dynamic inputs; i.e., as participants
arrive and depart.
A APPENDIX
A.1 Proofs omied from section 3
Proof of Lemma 3.1: Assume, by contradiction, that there exist stable matchings µ1 and µ2 so that for
some z ∈ S, r1 = dµ1(z) > dµ2(z) = r2. Let r = (r1 + r2)/2. For each x ∈ S, let P ′x = {y ∈ Px : d(x ,y) ≤ r } be
the preference list Px truncated to contain only those participants who are at a distance less or equal to r
from x . Let the ordering in the truncated list P ′x be denoted by ′x . Call the PMP restricted to the truncated
preference lists as the “truncated matching problem”. In the truncated matching problem, each person
prefers to remain unmatched than to match with a person at a distance greater than r from them. Let µ be a
stable matching for the PMP which has stable partners with a matching distance greater than r . Construct
the partial matching µ ′ from µ by removing all pairs with a distance greater than r . We show that µ ′ is
a stable matching for the truncated matching problem. Supposem and w are not matched to each other
in µ ′. If d(m,w) > r , then clearly (m,w) cannot form a blocking pair for the truncated matching problem.
Suppose d(m,w) ≤ r . Sincem and w are not matched to each other in µ ′, they cannot be matched to each
other in µ. Moreover, since µ is stable, either µ(m) m w , or µ(w) w m. Without loss of generality, assume
µ(m) m w . erefore,
d
(
m, µ(m)) ≤ d(m,w) ≤ r ⇒ µ(m) ′m w .
is impliesm is also matched to µ(m) in µ ′; i.e., µ ′(m) = µ(m). erefore, µ ′(m) ′m w and (m,w) cannot
be a blocking pair for µ ′. is proves that µ ′ is a stable matching for the truncated matching problem. Now
dene Sr (µ) to be the set of all users who are matched to someone at a distance greater than r in µ,
Sr (µ) ∆=
{
x ∈ S : dµ (x) > r
}
.
It is clear that Sr (µ) is the same set of users who are not matched in µ ′. By the Rural Hospital eorem, the
set of unmatched men and women in the truncated matching problem is the same in all stable matchings.
is implies Sr (µ) does not depend on µ. is contradicts our initial assumption, since z ∈ Sr (µ2) but
z < Sr (µ1), proving the lemma. 
Consider the RPMP-k . LetM andW represent the set of n men and n women, respectively. For any
prole a = (a1, ...,ak ) ∈ Qk , letMa andWa be the sets of all men and women whose proles equal a,
respectively. Dene Sa =Ma ∪Wa.
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Lemma A.1. Fix a ∈ Qk and without loss of generality assume |Ma | ≤ |Wa |. We claim that in every stable
matching, each man inMa will be matched to a woman inWa.
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that there is a stable matching µ and anm ∈ Ma such that µ(m) <Wa.
Since |Ma | ≤ |Wa |, there should also exist a woman w ∈ Wa such that µ(w) < Ma. However, since
d(m,w) = 0, w m µ(m) and m w µ(w). erefore, (m,w) forms a blocking pair for µ, which is a
contradiction. 
us, for any a ∈ Qk , every stable matching should rst try to match men inMa with women inWa
according to their tie-breaking preference lists. Any one unmatched woman in |Wa | will be matched to
someone at a further distance. DeneUa to be the set of all users with prole a, which are matched to
someone with a prole dierent from a. Note that according to the Rural Hospital eorem,Ua is the same
for all stable matchings and |Ua | =
|Ma | − |Wa |. Dene Sa =Ma ∪Wa. e following lemma shows
that if k is constant, then for any a ∈ Qk , |Ua | = O(
√
n).
Lemma A.2. For any arbitrary prole a ∈ Qk , as n →∞,
|Ma | − |Wa |√
2p(1 − p)n
d−−→ Z1 and |Sa | − 2np√
2p(1 − p)n
d−−→ Z2,
where p = 2−k , Z1 and Z2 are independent standard normal–N(0, 1)–random variables, and d−−→ represents
convergence in distribution.
Proof. First note that |Ma | and |Wa | are i.i.d. with a Binomial(n,p) distribution. From Central Limit
eorem (CLT) we have that as n →∞,
|Ma | − np√
np(1 − p)
d−−→ N1, |Wa | − np√
np(1 − p)
d−−→ N2,
where N1 and N2 are two independent random variables with a standard normal distribution, i.e., N1,N2 ∼
N(0, 1). erefore, as n →∞,
|Ma | − |Wa |√
2p(1 − p)n
d−−→ N1 − N2√
2
,
|Sa | − 2np√
2p(1 − p)n
d−−→ N1 + N2√
2
.
Dene Z1 = (N1 − N2)/
√
2 and Z2 = (N1 + N2)/
√
2. It is clear that Z1,Z2 ∼ N(0, 1). Moreover, since N1 and
N2 are independent, Z1 and Z2 are also independent. is completes the proof. 
Since Lemma A.1 requires each stable matching µ to rst match men and women in Sa using their
tie-breaking preference lists, the O(√n) discrepancy between the number of men and women in Sa makes
this sub-problem signicantly unbalanced. Using the approach of Ashlagi et al. [2015], we prove some
useful bounds on the number of stable partners in unbalanced matching problems which is true for every n.
Lemma A.3. Let r ≥ 1 and consider an unbalanced two-sided matching problem with n men and n + r
women represented byM andW, respectively. Suppose the men’s preference lists are generated independently
and uniformly at random from the set of all orderings of women in W. Similarly, suppose the women’s
preference lists are generated independently and uniformly at random from the set of all orderings of men in
M. For any given x ∈ M ∪W, let N (x) represent the number of x ’s stable partners. We have that
P
(
N (x) > 1) ≤ 1
r + 1 and E
(
N (x)) ≤ 1 + 1
r
.
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Proof. Let µM represent the men-optimal stable matching found by running the men-proposing deferred
acceptance algorithm, and let U be the set of all women who are not matched in µM . According to the
Rural Hospital eorem, the set of women who are unmatched is the same as U for all stable matchings.
Let w ∈ W\U be an arbitrary woman. In order to nd all the stable partners of w , we employ the same
algorithm that is used in McVitie and Wilson [1970], Immorlica and Mahdian [2005], and Ashlagi et al.
[2015]. It has been proved by Immorlica and Mahdian [2005] that the following algorithm outputs all the
stable partners of w .
Algorithm I
(1) Run the men-proposing algorithm to nd the men-optimal stable matching µM . If w is unmatched
in µM , output ∅. Initialze µ = µM .
(2) Setm = µ(w) and outputm as one of the stable partners ofw . en havew rejectm and remove the
pair (m,w) from µ. Set u =m. (u represents the current unmatched man.)
(3) Letw ′ be the next woman inu’s preference list whom he has not proposed to yet. Ifw ′ is unmatched
in µM , terminate the algorithm.
(4) (a) If w ′ has already received a proposal from someone beer than, she simply rejects u and the
algorithm continues to step 3.
(b) If not, w ′ accepts u’s proposal. If w = w ′, the algorithm continues to step 2. Otherwise, set
u = µ(m′) and the algorithm continues to step 3.
In order to analyze algorithm I, we use the principle of deferred decision which assumes that the random
preference lists are not known in advance and rather unfold step by step in the algorithms when a
proposal/rejection happens. Let ti be the time of the ith visit of the algorithm at step 3, and dene ui and
w ′i to be the unmatched man and the next woman who ui wants to propose to at time ti . Also dene Xi
to be the set of all women who ui has not proposed to yet at time ti . Since we are using the principle
of deferred decision, at any time ti , rankings of women in Xi are not yet unfolded in ui ’s preference list.
erefore, at any time ti , every woman in Xi has the same chance of 1/|Xi | to receive the next proposal
from ui . Dene the events Ei =
{
w ′i ∈ {w} ∪U
}
. Since the algorithm has not been terminated by time ti ,
U ⊆ Xi . erefore, given Ei , the probability that ui proposes to w is at most 1/(r + 1), and the probability
that the algorithm terminates is at least r/(r + 1), i.e. ,
P(w ′i = w | Ei ) ≤
1
r + 1 ,
and
P(e algorithm terminates at ti | Ei ) ≥ r
r + 1 .
As the algorithm progresses, woman w nds a new stable partner only if she receives a proposal from an
unmatched man at step 3 of the algorithm. Let Vi be the total number of proposals received by woman
w from time t1 to time ti . If Ei does not occur then Vi+1 = Vi , and if Ei occurs then Vi+1 = Vi + 1 with a
probability of at most 1/(r + 1) and the algorithm terminates with a probability at least r/(r + 1). erefore,
if V represents the total number of proposals received by w aer time t1, V is stochastically dominated by a
geometric random variable with rate p = r/(r + 1). us,
P(V > 0) ≤ 1
r + 1 ,
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and
E(V ) ≤ 1 − p
p
=
1
r
.
Since N(w) ≤ 1 +V , the proof is complete for any w ∈ W. It remains to prove the inequalities for x ∈ M.
Fix x ∈ M. Note that the two events {N(x) > 1} and {N(µM(x)) > 1} are equivalent. erefore, Since
µM(x) ∈ W,
P
(N(x) > 1) = P (N(µM(x)) > 1) ≤ 1
r + 1 .
Moreover, since
∑
m∈M N(m) =
∑
w ∈W\U N(w) (both are equal to the total number of stable partner pairs),
from symmetry we have,
E (N (x)) = 1
n
∑
m∈M
E (N(m)) = 1
n
∑
w ∈W\U
E (N(w)) ≤ 1 + 1
r
.

We now prove eorem 3.2 by using Lemmas A.2 and A.3.
Proof of eorem 3.2: Part (i). We prove this part of the theorem only for constant prole size k ≥ 1.
e proof for arbitrary prole size k ≤ (1 − ϵ) logn is similar. Fix n and consider an instance of the random
prole matching problem with n men and n women represented byM(n) andW(n), respectively. Let
x ∈ M(n) ∪W(n) be an arbitrary user and let a ∈ Qk represent his/her prole. DeneM(n)a ,W(n)a , and
S(n)a as before. Also dene Z (n)1 = (|S(n)a | − 2np)/
√
2np(1 − p) and Z (n)2 = (|W(n)a | − |M(n)a |)/
√
2np(1 − p).
According to Lemma A.2, as n → ∞, Z (n)1
d−−→ Z1 and Z (n)2
d−−→ Z2, where Z1,Z2 ∼ N(0, 1), and Z1 and Z2
are independent. For any ϵ > 0 dene subsets Aϵ ,Bϵ ⊆ R as follows,
Aϵ = [−∞,−1
ϵ
] ∪ [1
ϵ
,+∞], Bϵ = [0, ϵ] ∪ [1
ϵ
,+∞].
Let δ > 0 be an arbitrary positive number. Choose ϵ > 0 small enough to have, P (Z1 ∈ Aϵ ) ≤ δ8 and
P (|Z2 | ∈ Bϵ ) ≤ δ8 . Since Z (n)1 and Z (n)2 converge in distribution to Z1 and Z2, respectively, there exists a
large number N1 such that for any n > N1,P(Z1 ∈ Aϵ ) − P(Z (n)1 ∈ Aϵ ) < δ8 , P(Z2 ∈ Bϵ ) − P(Z (n)2 ∈ Bϵ ) < δ8 .
erefore, for any n > N1 we have,
P
(
Z (n)1 ∈ Aϵ or Z (n)2 ∈ Bϵ
)
≤ P(Z (n)1 ∈ Aϵ ) + P(Z (n)2 ∈ Bϵ )
≤ P(Z1 ∈ Aϵ ) +
P(Z (n)1 ∈ Aϵ ) − P(Z1 ∈ Aϵ )
+ P(Z2 ∈ Bϵ ) +
P(Z (n)2 ∈ Bϵ ) − P(Z2 ∈ Bϵ )
≤ δ2 .
erefore, with a probability of at least 1 − δ/2, the following event occurs:
E =
{
|S(n)a | ∈ [2np −C1
√
n, 2np +C1
√
n] and |W(n)a | − |M(n)a | ∈ [C2√n,C3√n]},
16
where C1 =
√
2p(1−p)
ϵ , C2 = ϵ
√
p(1 − p), and C3 =
√
p(1−p)
ϵ . Without loss of generality assume |M(n)a | ≤
|W(n)a | and dene r = |W(n)a | − |M(n)a |. e problem of matching men in M(n)a and women in W(n)a
according to preference lists given by P is an unbalanced matching problem with a discrepancy equal to r
between the number of men and the number of women. LetU(n)a represent the set of unmatched women in
the men-optimal stable matching for this unbalanced matching problem. erefore, if N (n)(x) represents
the number of x ’s stable partners, we have,
P
(
N (n)(x) > 1) ≤ P(Eo) + P(N (n)(x) > 1E)
= P(Eo) + P(x ∈ U(n)a E) + P(N (n)(x) > 1E,x < U(n)a )
≤ P(Eo) + r
|S(n)a |
+
1
r + 1
≤ δ2 +
C2
√
n
2np −C1√n
+
1
C1
√
n + 1
,
where in the rst inequality we used the results of the Lemma A.3, and in the last inequality we used the
bounds on r and |S(n)a | given by the event E. Pick N2 large enough to have,
C2
√
n
2np −C1√n
+
1
C1
√
n + 1
< δ/2, ∀n ≥ N2.
Dene N = max{N1,N2}. erefore, for any n > N , P
(
N (n)(x) > 1) ≤ δ . Since δ > 0 is arbitrary,
P
(
N (n)(x) = 1) → 1 as n →∞.
is implies that with high probability the fraction of users with multiple stable partners tends to zero as
n →∞.
Part (ii). In order to prove the second part of the theorem, note that since |Ma | and |Wa | are Binomial
random variables with parameters n and p = 2−k = 1/n, according to the well-known Poisson limit theorem,
both converge to the Poisson(1) distribution as n goes to innity. erefore, in the limit, with a positive
probability of c = e−2/4 there are exactly two men and two women whose proles are equal to a. On the
other hand, it is easy to see that in a random stable matching problem with two men and two women, the
probability of having exactly two stable matchings is equal to 1/8. erefore, for any given prole a ∈ Qk ,
with a positive probability of β = c/8 > 0, there are exactly two men and two women with prole a who
have multiple stable partners. is proves that the expected number of users with multiple stable partners
is O(n). Moreover, since the number of such proles is O(n), in expectation there are exponentially many
stable matchings. 
e following lemma shows that if the preference list of a user is uniquely identied by prole distances
and no further tie-breaking is required, then he/she has a unique stable partner.
Lemma A.4. In a prole matching problem, if the distances of a given user x from all the members of the
opposite sex are distinct, then x has a unique stable partner.
Proof. By contradiction, suppose x has two dierent stable partners y1 and y2. According to Lemma
3.1, y1 and y2 should be at the same distance from x . But, this contradicts with the assumption that x has
dierent distances from y1 and y2. erefore, x has a unique stable partner. 
In order to apply Lemma A.4, k should be large enough to have a unique stable matching without resorting
to tie-breaks. Now we prove eorems 3.3 and 3.4.
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Proof of eorem 3.3: Part (i). Let x be an arbitrary user and without loss of generality, assume x ∈ W.
Suppose x has multiple stable partners and let y and y ′ be two dierent stable partners of x . Since x has
multiple sable partners, y also has another stable partner x ′ (dierent from x). According to Lemma 3.1,
dh(x ,y ′) = dh(x ,y) = dh(x ′,y). For any z ∈ M dene the following event
Ez =
{∃x ′ ∈ W\{x},∃z ′ ∈ M\{z};dh(x , z ′) = dh(x , z) = dh(x ′, z)}.
Using the union bound we have,
P(Ez ) = P
(
∃x ′ ∈ W\{x};dh(x , z) = dh(x ′, z)
)
P
(
∃z ′ ∈ M\{z};dh(x , z) = dh(x , z ′)
)
≤
(
(n − 1)P(dh(x ,m) = dh(x , z)) ) ((n − 1)P(dh(w, z) = dh(x , z)) )
≤ n2 P(dh(x ,m) = dh(x , z))2
where m and w are a man and a woman who are chosen randomly fromM andW, respectively. Note
that in the last inequality we used the existing symmetry in the problem. Since dh(x ,m) has a binomial
distribution (as a function of the random variable m), the maximum value of P
(
dh(x ,m) = dh(x , z)
)
is at
dh(x , z) = bk/2c. Using the Sterling approximation we have:
P
(
dh(x ,m) = k2
)
=
k!
k
2 !
k
2 !
2−k '
√
2pik(ke )k
pik( k2e )k
2−k =
√
2
pi
1√
k
.
erefore,
P(x has multiple stable partners) ≤ P (∪z∈MEz ) ≤ n3 2
pik
.
Since k = Ω(n3), the right hand side of the above inequality tends to zero as n goes to innity. is implies
that with high probability the fraction of users with multiple stable partners tends to zero as n goes to
innity. Note that using the union bound, we can conclude that if k = Ω(n4), with high probability, there
exists a unique stable matching.
Part (ii). Fix a woman x ∈ W. For any y ∈ M, dene the event Ey = {∃y ′ ∈ M\{y};dh(x ,y) = dh(x ,y ′)}.
Also dene Ax to represent the event that the distances of x from all men inM are distinct. Similar to part
(i) we have
P(Acx ) ≤ P
(∪y∈MEy ) ≤ n2√ 2
kpi
.
According to Lemma A.4, if the event Ax happens for every x ∈ W, there is a unique stable matching
without resorting to tie-breaking. erefore,
P(ere are multiple stable matchings) ≤ P (∪x ∈WAcx ) ≤ n3√ 2kpi .
Since k = Ω(n6), the probability that there are multiple stable matchings goes to zero as n goes to innity.
Part (iii). Without loss of generality assume x ∈ W and let Xi represent the distance of x from manmi ,
i.e., di = dh(x ,mi ). Clearly, Xi ’s are i.i.d. with Binomial distribution with parameters k and 1/2. Dene
Z = mini Xi . Clearly dh(x) ≥ Z . erefore, for any positive number r > 0,
P(dh(x) ≥ r ) ≥ P(Z ≥ r ) = P(min
i
Xi ≥ r ) =
n∏
i=1
P(Xi ≥ r ) = P(X1 ≥ r )n .
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Now, according to the Cherno’s inequality,
P(X1 < r ) ≤ e− 1k ( k2 −r )2 .
erefore,
P(dh(x) ≥ r ) ≥ (1 − e− 1k ( k2 −r )2)n ≥ 1 − ne− 1k ( k2 −r )2 .
Now if we set r = k/2 − √βk logn we have,
P
(
dh(x) ≥ k/2 −
√
βk logn
)
≥ 1 − n1−β .

Proof of eorem 3.4: Part (i). Without loss of generality assume x ∈ M and suppose y is a stable
partner for x . If x has multiple stable partners, then y should also have multiple stable partners. Let x ′
be another stable partner of y dierent from x . According to Lemma 3.1, x and x ′ should have the same
distance from y. However, in the weighted hamming distance metric, if dw (a(y), a(x)) = dw (a(y), a(x ′)),
then x and x ′ should have the exact same proles, i.e., a(x) = a(x ′). erefore, if a man x has multiple
stable partners, there should exist another man x ′ with the same prole as him. However, by using union
bounds we get
P (∃x ′ ∈ M; a(x ′) = a(x)) ≤ (n − 1) 12k ≤ n
−ϵ .
is proves that the probability that x has multiple stable partners is vanishingly small.
Part (ii). We rst show that if there are multiple stable matchings, then there are two men (or women)
who have the same prole. If there are multiple stable matchings, there should exists a chain {ci }2s−1i=0 of
men and women such that ci ∈ M if i is even, and ci ∈ W if i is odd. Moreover, in this chain for every
i ∈ {0, . . . , 2s − 1}, ci+1 ci ci−1 (i − 1 and i + 1 are taken in mode 2s). Dene di = dw (ci , ci+1), 0 ≤ i < 2s .
Let j be the index at which di is minimum. Now, if the values of di are all distinct, then c j c j+1 c j+2 which
is a contradiction. erefore, ere should exist an index i such that, di = di+1. Following our discussion
in part (i), this implies that ci and ci+2 should have the same prole. However, the probability that two
randomly selected men (or women) have the same prole is 2−k . Using union bound we can conclude that
the probability that there are multiple stable matchings is upper bounded by n22−k ≤ n−ϵ .
part (iii) In order to analyzeX , x n and let ϵ > 0 be an arbitrary positive real number. Let µ be an arbitrary
stable matching. With out loss of generality assume x ∈ W and dene a = a(x). For any positive integer r ,
dene Sa(r ) as the set of all the users who have the same answers as x for the rst r questions,
Sa(r ) , {y ∈ M ∪W : a(y)[1 : r ] = a[1 : r ]} .
First note that for any given users x ,y ∈ Sa(r ) and y ′ < Sa(r ),
dw (x ,y) ≤ 2−r < dw (x ,y ′) =⇒ y x y ′.
erefore, if we deneWa(r ) = Sa(r ) ∩W andMa(r ) = Sa(r ) ∩ M, then the number of users in Sa(r )
who are not matched to someone in Sa(r ) in µ is
|Wa(r )| − |Ma(r )|. Set r = b(1 − ϵ) lognc and dene
pr = 2−r ≥ nϵ−1. Since |Wa | and |Ma | have Binomial distributions with parameters n and pr , following the
discussions in Lemma A.2, |Sa(r )| = O(prn) and
|Wa(r )| − |Ma(r )| = O(√prn). erefore,
P (dw (x) > 2−r ) = P (µ(x) < Sa(r )) =
|Wa(r )| − |Ma(r )|
|Sa(r )| = O(1/
√
prn) = O(n− ϵ2 ).
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is proves that,
P
(
logdw (x)
logn > −1 + ϵ
)
→ 0, as n →∞. (1)
On the other hand, if we set r ′ = d(1 + ϵ) logne, then,
P
(
dw (x) ≤ 2−r ′
)
= P (µ(x) ∈ Sa(r ′)) ≤ P (|Ma(r ′)| > 0) ≤ nPr ′ = n−ϵ ,
where in the last inequality we used the union bound inequality. erefore,
P
(
logdw (x)
logn < −1 − ϵ
)
→ 0, as n →∞. (2)
From (1) and (2) we can conclude that logdw (x)/logn converges to −1 in probability. 
A.2 Proofs omied from section 4
Proof of Lemma 4.2: Let x ,y ∈ S and suppose x ∈ I (y). Assume, by contradiction, Ms (x) < I (y).
erefore, either y ∈ I (x) orMs (y) ∈ I (x). Without loss of generality, assume y ∈ I (x). If x and y have
dierent colors, since
|x − y | < |I (x)| = |x −Ms (x)|, |x − y | < |I (y)| = |y −Ms (y)|,
(x ,y) will form a blocking pair forMs which is a contradiction. Now suppose x and y have the same color
and without loss of generality, assume |Ms (y) − x | ≤ |Ms (x) − y |. Since
|Ms (y) − x | < |I (y)| = |Ms (y) − y |, |Ms (y) − x | ≤ |Ms (x) − y | < |I (x)| = |x −Ms (x)|,
(Ms (y),x) is a blocking pair forM which is a contradiction. erefore,Ms (x) ∈ I (y) and the proof is
complete. 
For any x ,y ∈ R where x < y, dene д(x ,y) to be the dierence between the number of red and blue
points in the open interval (x ,y),
д(x ,y) , |{r ∈ R : r ∈ (x ,y)}| − |{b ∈ B : b ∈ (x ,y)}| .
For simplicity of notation, for x > y let д(x ,y) = д(y,x). LetM be a nested matching and let b ∈ B be an
arbitrary blue point which is matched underM. SinceM is nested, any red or blue point on x ’s matching
segment IM(x), should be matched to a point on IM(x). erefore, there should be an equal number of red
and blue points on IM(x). is implies that д
(
x ,M(x)) = 0.
Lemma A.5. For any b ∈ B,
P(b) = {r ∈ R : д(b, r ) = 0}.
Moreover, for any b1,b2 ∈ B, P(b1) ∩ P(b2) , ∅ implies P(b1) = P(b2) and д(b1,b2) = 1.
Proof. Let Q(b) represent the right hand side of the equation in the lemma. We want to prove that
P(b) = Q(b). For any r ∈ P(b), there exists a nested matchingM such thatM(b) = r . erefore, д(b, r ) = 0
and this implies that P(b) ⊆ Q(b). Now let r ∈ Q(b). Let S1 ⊆ S represent the set of all the point in S
between b and r , and let S′ = S\{S1 ∪ {b, r }}. Since r ∈ Q(b), S1 has an equal number of red and blue
points. LetM1 represent the stable matching for points in S1, and letM ′1 represent the stable matching for
points in S′1. According to Lemma 4.2, bothM1 andM ′1 are nested. LetM be the matching in which b is
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matched to r , and points in S1 and S′1 are matched according to matchingsM1 andM ′1, respectively. It is
clear that sinceM1 andM ′1 are nested,M is also nested. erefore, r is b’s potential match and r ∈ P(b).
is proves that Q(b) ⊆ P(b), and the proof for the rst part of the lemma is complete. Now let b1,b2 ∈ B
be two arbitrary blue points. Without loss of generality assume b1 < b2. Let r ∈ R be an arbitrary red point.
ere are three dierent possibilities for r ’s placement with respect to b1 and b2:
(1) b1 < b2 < r ⇒ д(b1,b2) = д(b1,y) − д(b2, r ) + 1.
(2) b1 < r < b2 ⇒ д(b1,b2) = д(b1, r ) + д(y,b2) + 1.
(3) r < b1 < b2 ⇒ д(b1,b2) = д(y,b2) − д(r ,b1) + 1.
Now if P(b1) ∩ P(b2) , ∅, there exists a red point r ∗ such that r ∗ ∈ P(b1) and r ∗ ∈ P(b2). erefore,
д(b1, r ∗) = д(b2, r ∗) = 0. According to the equations described above, we should have д(b1,b2) = 1 (in all
there cases). Now since д(b1,b2) = 1, with a same argument, we can conclude that for any r ∈ R, д(b1, r ) = 0
if and only if д(b2, r ) = 0. erefore, P(b1) = P(b2). 
Proof of Lemma 4.4: Let {xt }t ∈Z represent the sequence of all the points in S = B ∪ R, where x0 = b,
and for any t ∈ Z+, let xt and x−t represent the t th point to the right and the t th to the le of b, respectively.
Since, S is the mixture of two Poisson processes with rates λ and µ, {xt } occurs according to a Poisson
process with rate λ + µ. Moreover for any t ∈ Z, xt is red with probability p = µ/(λ + µ) and is blue with
probability q = 1 − p = λ/(λ + µ), independent from the color of the other points. Note that since λ < µ,
p > 1/2. Dene the sequence {дt }t ∈Z+ , where дt = д(x−1,xt ). It is easy to see that,
дt+1 =
{
дt + 1 if xt is red
дt − 1 if xt is blue .
erefore, the sequence {дt } is equivalent to a random walk on Z that starts at д1 = −1 and moves to
the right or le according to probabilities P(+1) = p and P(−1) = q. Suppose this random walk hits 0
at some some time t ∈ Z+, i.e. , дt = 0. If xt−1 is a red point then since д(b,xt−1) = д(x−1,xt ) = дt = 0,
then xt−1 ∈ P(b). If xt is a blue point then since д(b,xt ) = д(x−1,xt ) + 1 = дt + 1 = 1, then xt ∈ [b]. A
geometric interpretation of these facts is the following: If the random walk at time t hits zero from below,
then xt−1 ∈ P(b), and if it hits zero from above and then goes below zero, then xt ∈ [b].
Part (i). Since p > 1/2, limt→+∞ дt = +∞, almost surely. erefore, since the random walk starts at
−1, it hits 0 at some time t > 0, almost surely. Let t1 be the rst time that the random walk hits 0, i.e. ,
t1 = min{t : дt = 0}. Dene r1 = xt1−1. According to what we discussed above, r1 ∈ P(b). Similarly, we can
prove the existence of r2.
Part (ii), Let b1 = min{x ∈ [b] : x > b}. erefore, b and b1 are consecutive points in [b]. It is clear that it
is sucient to prove the statement for these two points. According to lemma 4.4, д(b,b1) = 1. erefore,
д(x−1,b1) = д(b,b1) − 1 = 0. Since t1 (dened in part (i)) is the rst time that the random walk hits 0, then
r1 < xt1 ≤ b1. erefore, r1 is a potential match between b and b1. If there exists another potential match
r2 = xt2 ∈ P(b) between b and b1, then since дt2+1 = 0, r2 > r1. But дt1 = дt2+1 = 0 and дt2 = −1. erefore,
there exists t1 ≤ t ′ < t2 such that дt ′ = 0 and дt ′+1 = −1. erefore, b ′ = xt ′ ∈ [b] which is a contradiction
with the fact hat b and b1 are consecutive in [b].
Part (iii). e third part of the lemma is an immediate result of part (ii).
Part (iv) Following the discussion we had at the beginning, the random walk nds a new blue point in [b]
if and only if it hits zero and then goes to −1. However, starting from zero, the probability that the random
walk visits −1 again is q/p = λ/µ [Kelly and Yudovina, 2014]. is proves that N +(b) has a geometric
distribution with rate 1 − λ/µ. By symmetry, the same holds for N −(b). 
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Lemma A.6. LetW = {wi } be a potential wave. Dene ui = wi −wi−1 (for valid values of i). en ui ’s are
i.i.d. random variables with distribution B(λ, µ).
Proof. Due to the existing symmetry, without loss of generality, assume b = wi is a blue point and
r = wi+1 is a red point. Now if we consider the forward queue matching described in section 2, it is easy to
see that ui = r − b is equivalent to the busy cycle of the corresponding LCFS-PR queue. 
Proof of eorem 4.5: According to Lemma 4.2, the stable matchingMs is nested. Let b ∈ B be an arbi-
trary blue point and let N = N +(b) and N ′ = N −(b) . According to Lemma 4.4, N and N ′ are i.i.d. geometric
random variables with parameter 1−λ/µ. Now considerb’s potential waveW = {wi }, −2N ′+1 ≤ i ≤ 2N−1
and dene Bi = wi −wi−1 for i ∈ {1, . . . , 2N + 1}, and B′i = wi −wi−1 for i ∈ {−2N ′, . . . , 0}. According to
Lemma A.6, Bi and B′i are i.i.d. random variables with distribution B(λ, µ). Now since b should be matched
with one of its potential partners in P(b), its matching distance cannot be less than min{B1,B′1} or more
than max
{∑2N−1
i=1 Bi ,
∑2N ′−1
i=1 B
′
i
}
. 
Proof of Corollary 4.6: Let b be an arbitrary blue point and letW(b) = wi , −2N ′ + 1 ≤ i ≤ 2N − 1,
represent its potential wave. Dene ui = wi+1 −wi for −2N ′ + 1 ≤ i ≤ 2N − 2. Let ci represent the number
of matching segments inMs which contain the interval (wi ,wi+1). It is clear that ci cannot be larger than
the total number of points inW(b) to the le of wi+1 or the total number of points inW(b) to the right of
wi . In other words, if we dene ai = min(i + 2N ′, 2N − 1 − i) then ci ≤ ai . erefore,
E
(
dM(b)
|[b]|) = 1|[b]| ∑
b′∈[b]
E
(
dM(b ′)
|[b]) = 1|[b]| 2N−2∑
i=−2N ′+1
ci E (ui ) ≤ 1|[b]|
2N−2∑
i=−2N ′+1
ai
1
µ − λ
= (|[b]| + 1) 1
µ − λ .
Since E ([b]) = E(N ) + E(N ′) − 1 = 2µ/(µ − λ) − 1, the proof is complete. 
A.3 Proof of Theorem 4.7
In this section we prove eorem 4.7. Suppose n = 2m > 0 be an even positive integer and let x = (x1, ...,xn)
be a sequence of n positive numbers. Let C(x) represent the conguration of n + 1 red and blue points
P1, ..., Pn+1 which are placed in order on the real line such that the point P1 is at the origin, and for any
1 ≤ i ≤ n, Pi+1 = Pi + xi . Moreover, suppose Pi is blue if i is even and it is red if i is odd. erefore, there
arem + 1 red points andm blue points in C(x). Since there is no assumption on the value of xi ’s, the stable
matching between points in B and R is not necessarily unique. (as an example consider the case where
xi = 1). LetM be a stable matching for this problem which is generated by the following algorithm. e
algorithm repeatedly matches an unmatched blue point b and an unmatched red point r which have the
minimum distance from each other, among all the remaining unmatched points, till no further matching is
possible. Let DM(x) represent the sum of all matching distances inM,
DM(x) ,
∑
P ∈C(x) is blue
|P −M(P)|.
Dene D(x) to be the expected value of DM(x), where the expectation is taken with respect to the random
stable matchings M which is generated according to the algorithm. Let ∏n represent the set of all
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Fig. 3. C(.1, .2, .3, .4)
permutations of n items. For any pi ∈ ∏n , let Dpi (x) = D (pi (x)) = D (pi (x1), ...,pi (xn)) . Dene E(x) to be the
expected value of Dpi (x), where the expectation is taken with respect to the random permutation pi :
E(x) = 1
n!
∑
pi ∈Πn
Dpi (x).
Figure 1 shows C(x) for n = 4 and x = (.1, .2, .3, .4). We can easily see that here D(x) = .4 and E(x) = 11/30.
We will show later that E(x) is a concave function of x. First consider the following denitions.
Denition A.7. For any positive integer k , Dene Ok to be the set of all sets of odd positive integers
o = {o1, ...,or } where ∑ri=1 oi = k .
Denition A.8. Let o = {o1, ...,or } ∈ Ok . Dene the function P : Ok → R+ as follows:
P(o) , 2
r−1∏k
i=1 i
c(o,i)c(o, i)! ,
where c(o, i) represents the number of appearance of the number i in o.
For example, for k = 6 we have O6 = {{1, 5}, {3, 3}, {3, 1, 1, 1}, {1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1}}. Furthermore, P ({1, 5}) = 25 ,
P ({3, 3}) = 19 , P ({3, 1, 1, 1}) = 49 , and P ({1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1}) = 245 . In the following lemma, we prove that for
any k the function P is a probability measure on Ok .
Lemma A.9. e function P is a probability measure on Ok . In other words:∑
o∈Ok
P(o) = 1.
Proof. From Taylor series expansion of log(x), for |x | < 1 we have,
log(1 + x) − log(1 − x) = 2
∞∑
i=1
x2i+1
2i + 1 .
erefore,
⇒ 1 + x1 − x =
∞∏
i=1
exp
(
2 x
2i+1
2i + 1
)
.
Now using the Taylor expansion of ex , we have:
1 +
∞∑
k=2
2xk = 1 + x1 − x =
∞∏
i=1
∞∑
j=0
(
2x2i+1
) j
(2i + 1)j j! .
From denition A.8, it is easy to see that if we expand the right hand side of the above equation as
∑∞
k=0 akx
k ,
then for any k ≥ 1, ak = 2 ∑o∈Ok P(o). In Other words,
1 +
∞∑
k=1
2xk =
∞∏
i=1
∞∑
j=0
(
2x2i+1
) j
(2i + 1)j j! = 1 +
∑
k=1
©­«2
∑
o∈Ok
P(o)ª®¬xk .
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is proves that for any k ≥ 1, ∑
o∈Ok
P(o) = 1.

Denition A.10. For any o = {o1, . . . ,or } ∈ Ok and any x = {x1, . . . ,xn}, dene Φ(o, x) to be the set of
all possible ways of spliing {x1, . . . xn} into sets with sizes o1, . . . ,or .
For example for o = {1, 1} ∈ O2 and x = {x1,x2,x3,x4},
Φ(o, x) = {{x1,x2}, {x1,x3}, {x1,x4}, {x2,x3}, {x2,x4}, {x3,x4}}.
It’s easy to see that
|Φ(o, x)| = n!(n − k)! ∏ri=1 oi ! ∏ki=1 c(o, i)! , (3)
where c(o, i) is the number of appreance of the number i in o.
Denition A.11. For any o = {o1, . . . ,or } ∈ Ok and any x = {x1, . . . ,xn}, dene f (o, x) as follows:
f (o, x) = 1|Φ(o, x)|
∑
ϕ∈Φ(o,x)
min
(
o1∑
i=1
x (1)i , . . . ,
or∑
i=1
x (r )i
)
,
where in the summation it is assumed that ϕ is in the following form,
ϕ =
{
{x (1)1 , . . . x (1)o1 }, . . . , {x (r )1 , . . . x (r )or }
}
.
For example for o = {1, 1} ∈ O2 and x = {x1,x2,x3,x4},
f (o, x) = 16
(
min(x1,x2),min(x1,x3),min(x1,x4),min(x2,x3),min(x2,x4),min(x3,x4)
)
.
In the following theorem, we nd a close expression for E(x) based on f (ok ,x) for dierent values of ok .
Theorem A.12. For any x ∈ Sn ,
E(x) =
∑
k≤n
k is even
ok ∈Ok
P(ok )f (ok , x),
Proof. Let n = 2m. Suppose x = (x1, . . . ,xn) and without loss of generality assume that x1 ≤ x2 ≤
· · · ≤ xn . Let pi be a random permutation which is drawn uniformly from ∏n . In order to nd a stable
matching for pi (x), the algorithm should rst nd an index i1 ∈ {1, . . . ,n} where Pi+1 − Pi = x1, and then
matches points Pi and Pi+1 to each other. Since, pi is drawn uniformly at random, i1 is uniformly distributed
over {1, . . . ,n}, i.e. , P(i1 = i) = 1/n,∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}. Due to the existing symmetry we can assume that
i1 ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. Now, conditioning on i1 we have,
E(x) = E(Dpi (x)) = 1
m
m∑
i=1
E
(
Dpi (x)|i1 = i
)
. (4)
For i = 1, by conditioning on the second segment at index 2, we have
E
(
Dpi (x)|i1 = 1
)
= x1 +
1
n − 1
∑
2≤i≤n
E(x{i }), (5)
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where x{i } represents the sequence of n − 2 positive numbers which is generated from x by removing x1
and xi . For i > 1, by conditioning on the segments at indices i − 1 and i + 1, we have
E
(
Dpi (x)|i1 > 1
)
= x1 +
2
(n − 1)(n − 2)
n∑
2≤i<j≤n
E(x{i, j }), (6)
where x{i, j } represent the sequence of n − 2 positive integers which is generated from x by removing x1,
xi , and x j and adding x1 + xi + x j . We prove the theorem by induction on n. For n = 2, it is clear that
E
((x1,x2)) = min(x1,x2). Assume the theorems statement is valid for n-2. From equations (4), (5), and (6)
and from the induction assumption it is clear that E(x) can be wrien as a linear combination of terms with
the following form,
A = min
(∑
x ∈S1
x , . . . ,
∑
x ∈Sr
x
)
, (7)
where Si ’s are disjoint subsets of {x1, . . . ,xn} with an odd size. Suppose Si = {x (i)1 , . . . x (i)oi } where oi = |Si |
and let k =
∑
i oi . Dene S = ∪Si . Let C represent the constant factor of the the term A show in equation
(7) in E(x). According to equation 3, It is sucient to prove that,
C = P
((o1, . . . ,ok )) × (n − k)! ∏ri=1 oi ! ∏ki=1 c(o, i)!
n!
=
2r−1∏k
i=1 i
c(o,i)c(o, i)! ×
(n − k)!∏ri=1 oi ! ∏ki=1 c(o, i)!
n!
=
(n − k)!2r−1 ∏ri=1 oi !
n!
∏r
i=1 oi
. (8)
We Prove this by considering two dierent cases: (i) x1 < S , and (ii) x1 ∈ Si for some i .
(i) e term A, has the following constant factor C1 in the equation 5,
C1 =
n − k − 1
n − 1
(n − 2 − k)!2r−1 ∏ri=1 oi !
(n − 2)! ∏ri=1 oi
=
n
n − k
(n − k)!2r−1 ∏ri=1 oi !
n!
∏r
i=1 oi
. (9)
e reason is that in order for term to appear in in E(x{i }), it is sucient to have i < S which occurs
with probability n−k−1n−1 . e term A also appear in E(x {i, j }) if i < S and j < S which occurs with
probability (n−k−1)(n−k−2)(n−1)(n−2) . erefore, the termA has the following constant factorC2 in the equation
6,
C2 =
(n − k − 1)(n − k − 2)
(n − 1)(n − 2)
(n − 2 − k)!2r−1 ∏ri=1 oi !
(n − 2)! ∏ri=1 oi
=
n(n − k − 2)
(n − k)(n − 2)
(n − k)!2r−1 ∏ri=1 oi !
n!
∏r
i=1 oi
. (10)
Since, C = 2nC1 +
n−2
n C2, it is easy to derive equation (8) from equations (9) and (10).
(ii) Without loss of generality assume x1 ∈ S1. First we consider the case where o1 > 1, i.e. , |S1 | ≥ 3.
It is clear that in this case the term A does not appear in equation (5), i.e. , C1 = 0. A appears
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in E(x{i, j }) if and only if i, j ∈ S1 which occurs with probability (o1−1)(o1−2)(n−1)(n−2) . erefore, it has the
following constant factor C2 in the equation (6),
C2 =
(o1 − 1)(o1 − 2)
(n − 1)(n − 2)
(n − k)!2r−1(o1 − 2)! ∏ri=2 oi !
(n − 2)!(o1 − 2)∏ri=2 oi .
=
n
n − 2
(n − k)!2r−1 ∏ri=1 oi !
n!
∏r
i=1 oi
. (11)
Since C = n−2n C2, we can derive the equation (8) from (11). For o1 = 1, the value of A is equal to x1.
On the other hand if we consider all the terms A with S1 = {x1}, it is easy to see that the sum of all
of their coecient is equal to 1 which is consistent with the coecient of x1 in equation 4 (if we
plug in equations (5)) and (6).

Corollary A.13. E(x) is a concave function of x.
Proof. According to denition A.11 it is clear that f (o, x) is a concave function of x (for any o). erefore,
from eorem A.12 we can conclude that E(x) is a concave function of x. 
Now dene xn = (1, . . . , 1), to be the sequence of n numbers all equal to 1. e following lemma proves
an upper bound for E(x) for arbitrary x in terms of E(xn).
Lemma A.14. For any x = (x1, . . . ,xn), we have
E(x) ≤ E(xn)
( 1
n
∑
i
xi
)
.
Proof. For any i ∈ {0, . . . ,n − 1}, dene x(i) = (xi+1, . . . , xn ,x1,xi ). First not that E(x(i)) = E(x),∀i ∈
{0, . . . ,n − 1}.Since E(x) is a concave function of x, we have
E(x) = 1
n
∑
i
E(x(i)) ≤ E ( 1
n
∑
i
x(i)
)
= E
( 1
n
∑
i
xi ,
1
n
∑
i
xi , . . . ,
1
n
∑
i
xi
)
= E(xn)
( 1
n
∑
i
xi
)
.

In the following lemma we prove an upper bound for E(xn).
Lemma A.15. Let n = 2m. We have,
E(xn) ≤ m(1 + lnm).
Proof. Similar to the proof of eorem A.12 conditioning on the value of the rst index i1, we have
E(xn) = 1 + 1
m
E(xn−2) + m − 1
m
E(x′n−2), (12)
where x′n−2 = (3, 1, . . . , 1) and has n−2 entries. According to Lemma A.14, E(x′n−2) ≤ nn−2E(xn−2). erefore,
E(xn) ≤ 1 + ( 1
m
+ 1)E(xn−2)
≤ 1 + ( m
m − 1 )E(xn−2).
erefore,
E(xn)
m
≤ 1
m
+
E(xn−2)
m − 1 . (13)
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By induction onm, we have
E(xn)
m
≤ 1
m
+
1
m − 1 + · · · + 1 ≤ 1 + lnm.
is completes the proof. 
Proof of theorem 4.7: Let b be an arbitrary blue point and letW(b) = wi , −2N ′ + 1 ≤ i ≤ 2N − 1,
represent its potential wave. Dene ui = wi+1 −wi for −2N ′ + 1 ≤ i ≤ 2N − 2. Letm = |[b]|. Assume that
ui ’s take their values from the set x = {x1, . . . ,x2m}. According to the denition of E(x), we have
E
(
X |m, x) = 1
m
E(x) ≤ (1 + lnm)( 12m ∑i xi ),
where in the last inequality we used the results of Lemma A.14 and A.15. Since x is arbitrary, we can
conclude
E(X |m) = E(E(X |x,m)) ≤ (1 + lnm) 1
µ − λ .
On the other hand, since ln(x) is a concave function, from Jensen inequality we have
E(X ) = E(E(X |m)) ≤ E((1 + lnm)) 1
µ − λ ≤
(
1 + lnE(m)) 1
µ − λ =
(
1 + ln
( µ + λ
µ − λ
) ) 1
µ − λ .

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